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THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION was established 
under the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991. The law 
instructs the Council "to evaluate the unemployment compensation program, 
including the purpose, goals, countercyclical effectiveness, coverage, benefit 
adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State administrative costs, admin-
istrative efficiency, and any other aspects of the program and make recom-
mendations for improvement." 
The Council completed its work in January 1996, after issuing three annu-
al reports. Findings and recommendations on each of the issues that Congress 
asked the Council to consider are contained in one or more of these reports. 
In addition, each annual report contains a number of background chapters, 
summarizing the research findings that informed the Council's deliberations. 
The Council's first annual report, issued in February 1994, focused pri-
marily on methods for improving the operation of the Extended Benefits 
Program. In addition, it addressed three issues that Congress specifically 
requested that the Council consider: use of substate or regional data in trig-
gering the Extended Benefits program, the work search test under Extended 
Benefits, and taxation of the wages of alien agricultural workers under the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act. 
The Council's second report, issued in February 1995, focused on the reg-
ular Unemployment Insurance program. It begins with a Statement of 
Purpose for the UI program and makes recommendations concerning the pro-
gram's countercyclical effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, and trust 
fund solvency. 
ix 
x / PREFACE 
The Council's third and final report was issued in January 1996. Focused 
primarily on defining federal-state relations in the UI program, that report 
begins with a statement that responsibilities and powers should be shared 
within the Unemployment Insurance program. The report's recommenda-
tions suggest methods that could be used to improve the quality and effi-
ciency of the administration of the Unemployment Insurance program. 
This compilation contains the findings and recommendations, in chrono-
logical order, from the Council's three reports. For easy reference, a double-
numbering system is used for the recommendations. The first number is the 
year of the pUblication of the report in which a recommendation appeared, 
and the second number shows the order of that recommendation in the orig-
inal document. (For example, Recommendation 1994-1 is the first recom-
mendation from the 1994 report.) 
For cases in which the Council addressed issues in more than one of its 
reports, footnotes with asterisks (*) have been added to the original findings 
and recommendations noting the location of the additional reference(s). The 
subject index in this volume provides additional assistance in locating rec-
ommendations. Ordering information for the Council's three annual reports 
appears at the end of this document. 
1 / 1994 Findings 
and Recommendations: 
Extended Benefits 
PURPOSE OF THE EXTENDED BENEFITS PROGRAM 
The Council finds that the nature of unemployment has changed since the 
inception of the Unemployment Insurance system. The length of time that 
individuals are unemployed, which increases sharply during recessions, has 
also increased slowly but steadily during non-recessionary times. Workers 
who have been laid off from their jobs are now less likely to return to their 
previous jobs than has historically been the case. This indicates an increase 
in the level of long-term unemployment in the economy. 
The Unemployment Insurance system was designed primarily as a means 
of alleviating the hardship caused by short-term unemployment. The system 
was never intended to combat long-term unemployment. The purpose of the 
Unemployment Insurance system, and in particular the Extended Benefits 
program, must be expanded if the system is to deal effectively with the 
changing nature of unemployment. In doing so, however, careful considera-
tion must be given to the funding of the system, in order to ensure that expen-
ditures for combatting long-term unemployment do not drain the Unem-
ployment Insurance trust fund reserves. It must also be recognized that while 
Unemployment Insurance reform is a necessary component of developing 
effective strategies for dealing with long-term unemployment, other 
reforms--especially among programs for dislocated workers-will be needed. 
NOTE: These fmdings and recommendations are reprinted from Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation (ACUC), Report and Recommendations (Washington, DC: ACUC, 1994), pp. 7-14. 
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1994-1. Recommendation 
The scope of the Extended Benefits program should be expanded 
to enhance the capacity of the Unemployment Insurance system 
to provide assistance for long-term unemployed workers as well 
as short-term unemployed workers. Those individuals who are 
long-term unemployed should be eligible for extended Unem-
ployment Insurance benefits, provided they are participating in 
job search activities or in education and training activities, where 
available and suitable, that enhance their re-employment 
prospects. To maintain the integrity of the Unemployment 
Insurance income support system, a separate funding source 
should be used to finance job search and education and training 
activities for long-term unemployed workers.l 
THE TRIGGER FOR EXTENDED BENEFITS 
The Council finds that receipt of Unemployment Insurance benefits by the 
unemployed has slowly but steadily declined since at least 1947-the first 
year for which data on the system are available. In addition to the long-term 
downward trend in receipt of benefits, there was a pronounced decline in the 
early 1980s, just as the economy entered a recession. 
The reasons behind the decline in the Unemployment Insurance system 
are many. The long-term decline appears to have been caused by the chang-
ing demographics of the labor force, the changing industrial and geographic 
composition of employment, and a decline in the solvency of states' 
Unemployment Insurance trust funds. * The sharp decline in receipt of bene-
fits in the early 1980s appears to be attributable primarily to changes in fed-
eral policies which encouraged the states to increase the solvency of their 
trust funds by restricting eligibility for Unemployment Insurance benefits 
and/or increasing employers' tax rates, as well as independent state efforts to 
improve their trust fund solvency. 
The utilization of the Unemployment Insurance system is measured by 
the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR). The IUR is the number of Un-
employment Insurance recipients, relative to the number of individuals in 
lOne member of the Council emphasizes that an increase in employers' payroll taxes should not 
be used as the funding source. Another member emphasizes that such a recommendation must be 
considered in the context of reform of dislocated workers programs. 
* Additional findings on the long-term decline are included in the 1996 findings (see p. 28). 
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UI-covered employment. Since the inception of the Extended Benefits pro-
gram in 1970, states have been required to use the state IUR as a "trigger" 
that determines whether or not individuals who have exhausted their regular 
UI benefits are eligible for Extended Benefits. 
Research has shown that the decline in the utilization of the Un-
employment Insurance system has caused the IUR to become a less reliable 
indicator of economic conditions, reducing the likelihood that Extended 
Benefits will trigger on in states with high unemployment. In addition, just 
as the IUR was experiencing a marked decline during the recession of the 
1980s, the "trigger" level required to become eligible for Extended Benefits 
was raised. 
The combination of the reduction in the IUR and the increase in the trig-
ger level resulted in the failure of the Extended Benefits program to trigger 
on as unemployment continued to rise during this most recent recession. As 
a result, Congress found it necessary to pass a series of emergency extensions 
of Unemployment Insurance benefits. The Council finds that emergency 
extensions of Unemployment Insurance benefits are extremely inefficient 
since they are neither well-timed nor well-targeted. Therefore, it is necessary 
to reform the Extended Benefits program prior to the onset of the next reces-
sion, in order to minimize the need for future emergency legislation. 
The Council has considered a variety of measures that could be used to 
trigger the Extended Benefits program. While no perfect measures exist, the 
best available evidence about the condition of the overall labor market with-
in a state is the Total Unemployment Rate (TUR), which indicates the supply 
of individuals who are unable to find work. It should be noted, however, that 
the TUR rates for January 1994 will be affected by the redesign of the Current 
Population Survey. An alternative measure of the labor market conditions 
that are faced by Unemployment Insurance recipients is the Adjusted Insured 
Unemployment Rate (AIUR), which is the IUR adjusted to include those indi-
viduals who have exhausted their regular Unemployment Insurance benefits. 
The Council finds that while substate (or regional) data are available on 
some measures of local labor market conditions, these data are extremely 
unreliable measures of the true conditions that the unemployed face. 
Furthermore, there would be substantial administrative difficulties in using 
either subs tate or regional data for triggering Extended Benefits. 
The Council finds that, in addition to problems with the triggers that have 
been used to determine whether or not Extended Benefits are available with-
in a state, the thresholds built into the triggers have been problematic. These 
thresholds require that a state's unemployment rate (whether measured by the 
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IUR or the TUR) exceed the level that prevailed over the previous two-year 
period (by a factor of 120 percent for the IUR or 110 percent for the TUR). 
The threshold requirements do not significantly affect the number of 
states in which Extended Benefits trigger on during a recession. However, 
the thresholds have the effect of delaying the point at which Extended 
Benefits trigger on in some states with the highest unemployment, as well as 
hastening the point at which such states trigger off the Extended Benefits 
program. As a result, the thresholds have caused dissatisfaction among some 
with the operation of the program since those states suffering the most eco-
nomic hardship are triggered on for the shortest period of time. This problem 
could be addressed by eliminating the thresholds and setting the triggers at a 
slightly higher level. 
1994-2. Recommendation 
The Council is unanimous in the view that there is a pressing need 
to reform the Extended Benefits program. 
The majority of the Council recommends that the Extended 
Benefits program should trigger on when a state's seasonally adjust-
ed total unemployment rate (SlUR) exceeds 6.5 percent as mea-
sured before the Current Population Survey redesign! Two members 
of the Council recommend that each state should have the choice 
of using either the SlUR trigger of 6.5 percent with a threshold 
requirement of 110 percent above either of the two previous years, 
or an IUR or AIUR trigger set at 4 percent with a threshold require-
ment of 120 percent over the previous two year period. 
The Council hopes Congress can implement these reforms 
promptly. Although the Council has reservations about the ineffi-
cient targeting of emergency benefits, Congress should extend the 
existing Emergency Unemployment Compensation for a six month 
period to provide a bridge program until these Extended Benefits 
reforms can be implemented.3 
, Two members of the Council recommend that the trigger should be set at 6.5 percent regardless 
of any changes in the measured unemployment rate that result from the redesign of the Current 
Population Survey. 
'Two members do not agree to the recommendation that Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation should be extended. 
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1994-3. Recommendation 
Neither substate nor regional data should be used for the purpose 
of determining whether or not Extended Benefits are available 
within a given area. 
FINANCING EXTENDED BENEFITS REFORM 
The Council finds that the integrity of the Unemployment Insurance system 
as well as its capacity to adapt to the changing nature of unemployment are 
compromised by incorporating its trust funds into the unified federal budget. 
While the flow of funds into the Extended Unemployment Compensation 
account may be adequate to finance the recommended Extended Benefits 
reform, such reform is complicated by the use of dedicated Unemployment 
Insurance trust funds for the purpose of deficit reduction. Several members 
of the Council believe that prompt action should be taken to correct this sit-
uation. Other members feel that the issue of how trust fund accounts should 
be treated in the budget is a very complex one, and requires careful consid-
eration within a broader context. The Council intends to revisit this issue in 
its future deliberations. * 
1994-4. Recommendation 
If additional revenue is required to implement the Council's rec-
ommendations, such revenue should be generated by a modest 
increase in the FUTA taxable wage base, to $8,500.4,** 
WORK SEARCH TEST UNDER EXTENDED BENEFITS 
The Council finds that another problematic aspect of the Extended Benefits 
program is the federal requirement that, with some exceptions, those indi-
viduals who are receiving Extended Benefits must accept a minimum wage 
job if one is offered, or become ineligible for benefits. While the Council 
understands that recipients of both regular and extended Unemployment 
Insurance benefits have an obligation to search actively for work and accept 
appropriate job offers, the Council finds the current federal requirements to 
*Recommendation 1995-7 addresses this issue. 
4 Two members object to this recommendation. 
**The Council later made an alternative recommendation on this issue (see 1996-20). 
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be excessively onerous. All states use a "suitability" test to determine the 
jobs which claimants are required to accept to remain eligible for benefits. 
This test gives states the flexibility to ensure adequate work search by 
claimants, while protecting unemployed workers' living standards and job 
skills by permitting them to decline substandard jobs. The states are in a bet-
ter position to determine appropriate mechanisms for enforcing a work 
search test, given the particular conditions of their labor markets. 
1994-5. Recommendation 
The federal requirement that individuals who are recelvmg 
Extended Benefits must accept a minimum wage job if one is 
offered, or become ineligible for benefits, should be eliminated. 
Each state should be allowed to determine an appropriate work 
search test, based on the conditions of its labor market. 
STATE TRUST FUND SOLVENCY 
The Council finds an overall decline in receipt of Unemployment Insurance 
benefits among the unemployed. This decline is at least partially caused by 
the inadequate reserves of many states' trust funds. During the past decade, 
many states with low or negative trust fund reserves have found themselves 
in the position of either having to increase taxes on employers in the midst of 
an economic downturn, or having to take measures to restrict eligibility and 
benefits for the unemployed. Some believe that this reliance on pay-as-you-
go funding has worked to the overall detriment of the Unemployment 
Insurance system. 
The Council believes that it would be in the interest of the nation to begin 
to restore the forward-funding nature of the Unemployment Insurance sys-
tem, resulting in a building up of reserves during good economic times and a 
drawing down of reserves during recessions. The Council finds, however, 
that any move toward creating federal guidelines for states' Unemployment 
Insurance trust fund accounts must be carefully weighed. Otherwise, there 
will be a risk of creating undue incentives for the states to restrict the eligi-
bility and level of Unemployment Insurance benefits in order to achieve the 
solvency guidelines. The Council intends to make specific recommendations 
on this issue in future reports. * 
*The Council made recommendations on both solvency and eligibility issues in its 1995 report. 
Recommendations 1995-3 to 1995-6 address solvency, and Recommendations 1995-9 and 1995-17 
to 1995-20 address eligibility. 
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FUTA TAXATION OF ALIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS 
The Council was asked by Congress to consider the treatment of alien agri-
cultural workers within the Unemployment Insurance system. Currently, the 
wages paid to alien agricultural workers with H2-A visas are exempt from the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). This exemption is set to expire on 
January 1, 1995. 
The Council finds that there are arguments both for and against contin-
uing this exemption. Under the current exemption, alien agricultural work-
ers are less costly to hire than domestic workers, on whom FUTA taxes 
must be paid. This cost differential may create an incentive for substitution 
of foreign workers for U.S. workers, which argues in favor of repeal of the 
exemption. Furthermore, the process of certifying workers and issuing H2-A 
visas imposes costs on the federal and state governments that have the 
responsibility for overseeing this process. The vast majority (97 percent) of 
the cost of the certification process is funded through the FUTA tax. Since 
FUTA serves as the mechanism for funding the costs of the certification 
process, there is an additional rationale for repealing the exemption of H2-A 
workers from FUTA taxation. 
On the other hand, H2-A workers are ineligible to receive Unemployment 
Insurance benefits since their visas require that they return to their country of 
origin within ten days after their employment terminates. Consequently, 
these individuals cannot meet the "available for work" test of the 
Unemployment Insurance system. Thus, FUTA taxes would be imposed upon 
the wages of individuals who cannot receive Unemployment Insurance ben-
efits, which argues against imposing the FUTA tax on their wages. 
On balance, the Council finds that the arguments in favor of FUTA taxa-
tion of alien agricultural workers outweigh the arguments against continuing 
that exemption. 
1994-6. Recommendation 
As of January 1, 1995, the wages of alien agricultural workers 

































THE PURPOSE OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation finds that, although 
an increasing percentage of the unemployed experience long spells of unem-
ployment, the majority of the unemployed experience relatively short unem-
ployment spells. Similarly, while a growing minority of individuals who 
receive Unemployment Insurance exhaust their benefits without having 
found new employment, the majority of individuals receive Unemployment 
Insurance benefits for a relatively short period of time before returning to 
employment. This reality dictates that the Unemployment Insurance system 
must be designed to deal effectively with a variety of needs. In particular, the 
system must both provide temporary wage replacement to individuals and 
facilitate the productive reemployment of those individuals who experience 
longer spells of unemployment. 
The Unemployment Insurance system also serves an important macro-
economic stabilization role by injecting additional money into the economy 
during periods of downturn. This objective, however, can only be achieved 
effectively if the system is forward-funded, thereby accumulating funds dur-
ing periods of economic health. 
These findings lead the Council to a formulation of the following state-
ment of purpose for the Unemployment Insurance system. 
NOTE: These findings and recommendations are reprinted from Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation (ACUC), Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Benefits, Financing, Cover-
age (Washington. DC: ACUC. 1995). pp. 7-23. 
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1995-1. Statement of Purpose 
The most important objective of the u.s. system of Unem-
ployment Insurance is the provision of temporary, partial wage 
replacement as a matter of right to involuntarily unemployed indi-
viduals who have demonstrated a prior attachment to the labor 
force. This support should help to meet the necessary expenses of 
these workers as they search for employment that takes advantage 
of their skills and experience. Their search for productive reem-
ployment should be facilitated by close cooperation among the 
Unemployment Insurance system and employment, training, and 
education services. In addition, the system should accumulate 
adequate funds during periods of economic health in order to pro-
mote economic stability by maintaining consumer purchasing 
power during economic downturns. 
FUNDING OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
The Unemployment Insurance system's capacity to promote economic sta-
bility rests on two key aspects of its funding mechanism. First, the funding 
of the system is "experience rated"-that is, employers who have been 
responsible for greater demands on the system pay higher taxes and conse-
quently bear a greater share of the system's costs. Second, during periods of 
prosperity, the system accumulates reserves that are then spent during peri-
ods of economic decline. 
Some members of the Council believe that experience rating is a crucial 
component of the program, providing effective incentives for employers to 
avoid laying off workers. Other members believe that experience rating caus-
es employers to make excessive use of the system's appeal mechanism in an 
attempt to keep their experience-rated taxes as low as possible. Although the 
Council was unable to resolve this difference of opinion, it intends to address 
the issue of experience rating in its next annual report. * 
The Council unanimously concludes, however, that promoting economic 
stability is an objective that transcends the interests of the states and cannot 
be achieved by states working in isolation. While some states have attempt-
ed to maintain an adequate degree of forward funding, others have not. The 
*The Council returned to this issue in its 1996 report, but was unable to come to a resolution (see 
pages 39-40). 
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low reserves in some states' trust funds weaken the Unemployment Insurance 
system's capacity to achieve its economic stabilization function. 
Effectively promoting the forward funding of the Unemployment 
Insurance system requires a coherent federal strategy that includes congres-
sionally stated goals. * 
1995-2. Recommendation 
Congress should establish an explicit goal to promote the forward 
funding of the Unemployment Insurance system. In particular, 
during periods of economic health, each state should be encour-
aged to accumulate reserves sufficient to pay at least one year of 
Unemployment Insurance benefits at levels comparable to its pre-
vious "high cost." For purposes of establishing this forward-fund-
ing goal, previous "high cost" should be defined as the average of 
the three highest annual levels of Unemployment Insurance ben-
efits that a state has paid in any of the previous 20 calendar years. 
To complement these forward-funding goals, financial incentives to 
encourage forward funding should be created. This can be done by changing 
the structure of the interest rates that the federal government pays to the 
states on their Unemployment Insurance trust fund balances. A slight reduc-
tion in the interest rate paid on low levels of states' trust funds could be used 
to finance a fairly substantial interest rate premium paid on high levels of 
reserves. While it is difficult to predict with accuracy how many states would 
respond to such incentives, careful management of the interest rate structure 
could ensure that these incentives could be financed without additional cost 
to the federal government. 
1995-3. Recommendation 
To encourage further forward funding, an interest premium 
should be paid on that portion of a state's Unemployment 
Insurance trust fund that is in excess of one "high cost" year of 
reserves. The cost of this interest rate premium should be financed 
by a reduction in the interest rate paid on that portion of each 
state's trust fund that is less than one "high cost" year of reserves. 
*The Council issued a comprehensive statement of federal-state responsibilities in its 1996 report 
(see Recommendation 1996-1). 
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The u.s. Department of Labor should be given authority to adjust 
periodically the interest rate structure to ensure that these incen-
tives create no additional cost to the federal government. 
The Council finds that the current federal policy of providing short-term, 
interest-free loans to state trust funds creates a disincentive for states to for-
ward fund their systems. Preferential loan treatment should be available only 
to states that have met, or made satisfactory progress toward, the forward-
funding goal. An example of how satisfactory progress might be defined is 
presented in Chapter 5 of this report. 
1995-4. Recommendation 
Preferential interest rates on federal loans to the states should be 
restricted to those states that have achieved (or made satisfactory 
progress toward) the forward-funding goal. In particular, the cur-
rent system of making interest-free, cash-flow federal loans gen-
erally available to all states should be ended~ Rather, these inter-
est-free loans should be made available only to those states that 
have achieved (or made satisfactory progress toward) the forward-
funding goal prior to the onset of an economic downturn. In other 
states, these loans should be subject to the same interest charges 
that are incurred on long-term loans to state Unemployment 
Insurance trust funds. 
1995-5. Recommendation 
A method is needed for determining whether a state that has not 
yet met the forward-funding goal has made "satisfactory progress" 
toward the goal. This method should be based on an empirical 
analysis of the rate at which state trust funds must be restored 
during periods of economic health in order to achieve the for-
ward-funding goal prior to a recession. 
1995-6. Recommendation 
When states have achieved (or made satisfactory progress toward) 
the forward-funding goal, yet find it necessary to borrow from the 
federal government, the interest rate charged on long-term loans 
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should be a preferential rate that is 1 percentage point lower than 
would otherwise be charged. 
The Council has discussed the level at which the taxable wage base and 
tax rate established by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) should be 
set. This is a complex issue. FUTA revenues are earmarked for financing the 
administration of the nation's Unemployment Insurance system, as well as 
that of the U.S. Employment Service. However, because the trust funds are 
currently held within the unified federal budget, it is not possible for these 
programs to achieve direct access to the funds that are earmarked for them. 
In addition, a two-tenths surcharge that was imposed in 1977 to payoff trust 
fund debts has been extended well beyond the time when the debt was repaid. 
Quite apart from these issues, the Council has not yet made a determination 
of whether or not additional revenues from FUTA would contribute to more 
efficient and effective operation of the Unemployment Insurance system and 
the Employment Service. 
Another element of complexity results from the fact that the minimum 
taxable wage base that the states use for financing their Unemployment 
Insurance benefits is tied to the FUTA taxable wage base. On average, those 
states with higher taxable wage bases have a higher level of reserves than do 
states that have set their taxable wage base at the minimum level of $7,000. 
Consequently, raising the FUTA taxable wage base might contribute to the 
overall forward funding of the system. 
Furthermore, a low taxable wage base within a state tends to impose the 
burden of Unemployment Insurance payroll taxes disproportionately on 
employers of low-wage workers. To the extent that employers pass on a por-
tion of the tax to their workers in the form of lower wages, therefore, a dis-
proportionate share of the burden of the tax is ultimately borne by low-wage 
workers. Those low-wage workers who work part-time or part-year, how-
ever, are often ineligible for Unemployment Insurance. As a result, the low 
taxable wage base within the Unemployment Insurance system is both 
regressive and unfair. 
The Council has not yet reached a consensus on how to address these inter-
related issues most effectively. As it considers the issues of administrative 
funding and efficiency over the course of the next year, however, the issue of 
the FUTA taxable wage base and tax rate will once again be addressed. * 
*Relevant recommendations are 1994-4 and 1996-20. 
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The Council does note, however, that the Unemployment Insurance system 
was intended as a self-contained system of social insurance. Inherent in this 
design is the principle that funds are accumulated and held in trust solely for 
their intended purpose: namely, the payment of benefits to eligible unemployed 
workers, economic stimulus, and the costs of administering the system. 
Inclusion of FUTA accounts and state Unemployment Insurance trust fund 
accounts within the unified federal budget undermines the integrity of the 
Unemployment Insurance system. Since federal budget offsets must be identi-
fied before additional FUTA funds (which are earmarked for program adminis-
tration) can be appropriated, some states have found it necessary to divert their 
trust funds to pay for administrative expenses--expenses that should be paid 
out of the FUTA trust fund. This diversion, while perhaps necessary, tends to 
erode the integrity of the system's financing. Employer willingness to con-
tribute to the system, state capacity to develop and maintain adequate trust 
funds, and worker confidence in the system are all undermined. 
Furthermore, when Unemployment Insurance trust fund balances that have 
been explicitly accumulated for countercyclical purposes are used to balance 
the annual federal budget, the system loses its capacity to increase spending 
automatically during recessions. Consequently, unlike other trust funds held by 
the federal government, the Unemployment Insurance trust funds are rendered 
fundamentally incapable of achieving one of their major objectives--econom-
ic stabilization-through their inclusion in the unified federal budget. 
1995-7. Recommendation 
All Unemployment Insurance trust funds should be removed from 
the unified federal budget. 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE AND TAXATION 
Virtually all wage and salaried workers are covered by Unemployment 
Insurance, and their employers pay taxes into the system accordingly. There 
are, however, two important exceptions. The first exception is that nonprofit 
employers do not pay FUTA taxes, despite the fact that their employees are 
eligible for Unemployment Insurance, use the system, and generate adminis-
trative costs for the system. In calendar year 1992, this exemption cost the 
federal trust funds approximately $300 million. The second exception is that 
agricultural workers on small farms are not covered by Unemployment 
Insurance. The Council finds no justification for either of these exceptions. 
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1995-8. Recommendation 
The FUTA exemption for nonprofit employers should be eliminated. 
1995-9. Recommendation 
The exemption of agricultural workers on small farms from 
Unemployment Insurance coverage should be eliminated.' 
The Council also finds that Unemployment Insurance taxes owed by farm 
labor contractors ("crew leaders") often are not paid. Federal law specifies 
that, under most circumstances, these farm labor contractors are the desig-
nated employers of their workers and that they are responsible for the pay-
ment of Unemployment Insurance taxes. It is difficult, however, to enforce 
this provision because of the many obstacles that prevent locating crew lead-
ers who have outstanding tax obligations. 
1995-10. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended so that farm owners or operators 
are assigned responsibility for unpaid Unemployment Insurance 
taxes owed by the crew leaders with whom they contract for 
workers on their farms. 2 
The Council finds that some employers improperly avoid paying Unem-
ployment Insurance taxes by misclassifying their employees as independent 
contractors. Clear definitions that delineate the conditions under which an 
individual would legitimately be qualified as an independent contractor 
would help to alleviate this problem. 
Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 protects businesses that have "rea-
sonable basis" for misclassifying employees as independent contractors. 
Businesses that fall under the Section 530 "safe harbor" are not required to 
correct the classification of employees and cannot be assessed back taxes or 
penalties based on the misclassification of workers. Section 530 also prohibits 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from clarifying the guidelines for deter-
mining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. The 
ambiguity of these guidelines is the cornerstone of the misclassification prob-
I Two members of the Council object to this recommendation. 
2 One member of the Council objects to this recommendation. 
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lem and the tax revenue losses associated with it. In addition, revenue collec-
tion is limited by Section 3509 of the Internal Revenue Code, which caps the 
employment tax liability of those businesses not covered by Section 530. 
The greatest revenue loss results from businesses that do not file infor-
mation returns on independent contractors. These are circumstances under 
which businesses are most likely to misclassify workers, as well as the cir-
cumstances under which independent contractors are least likely to report 
their entire income. Increasing the penalty for failing to file information 
returns would increase the incentive to file, increase the percentage of inde-
pendent contractor income reported, and provide the information needed to 
identify employers that misclassify workers-thereby creating an incentive 
to classify workers correctly. 
While the Council recognizes that correcting these problems would have 
ramifications that reach far beyond the Unemployment Insurance system, the 
Council finds that the problems are sufficiently serious to merit action at both 
the state and federal levels. 
1995-11. Recommendation 
States should review and consider adopting the best practices of 
other states to address classification issues which include the fol-
lowing: clarifying the definitions of employee and independent 
contractor; specifying employer liability for payroll taxes; licens-
ing, bonding, or regulating the employee leasing industry; and 
strategic targeting of audits. 
1995-12. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended to eliminate the "prior audit" safe 
harbor provision of Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. 
1995-13. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended to eliminate the provIsion of 
Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 that bars the IRS from 
issuing guidelines to define the employment relationship. 
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1995-14. Recommendation 
Federal law should be amended to repeal Section 3509 of the 
Internal Revenue Code and to require businesses to pay all taxes 
owed for workers that are misclassified after the enactment of the 
repeal. 
1995-15. Recommendation 
The $50 penalty for businesses that fail to file information returns 
with the IRS or with the independent contractor they have hired 
should be increased. 
The Council notes that available statistics do not accurately measure the 
level of Unemployment Insurance receipt among the unemployed (that is, 
"recipiency"). The measure of the "insured unemployed" (IU) and the ratio 
of insured unemployed to the covered labor force (that is, the insured unem-
ployment rate-the IUR) are frequently used for a number of purposes. When 
used as measures of recipiency, however, they are misleading. Both statistics 
consistently overstate the number of individuals who actually receive 
Unemployment Insurance benefits in a given week. In addition to counting 
recipients, the two measures both include individuals who file a claim for, but 
do not receive, benefits in a given week (these include individuals on a wait-
ing week, individuals whose claims are ultimately denied for nonmonetary 
reasons, and individuals who are disqualified for a given week). At the 
national level, this inclusion has the effect of overstating the number of the 
unemployed who actually receive Unemployment Insurance benefits by 
approximately 10 percent (although there is considerable variation among 
the states in the extent to which currently reported statistics overstate the 
actual receipt of benefits). * 
1995-16. Recommendation 
The U.S. Department of Labor should report a measure of Unem-
ployment Insurance recipiency. The measure should be a ratio, 
with the numerator defined as the number of individuals who are 
actually paid Unemployment Insurance benefits, and the denomi-
nator defined as the total number of unemployed individuals. 
*Additional recommendations regarding data can be found in 1995-24, and 1996-12 to 1996-15. 
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ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
Five percent of all workers in 1993 reported that they were unable to find 
full-time employment, and 16 percent of the work force held part-time jobs. 
The Council finds that in some states, these individuals are unable to qualify 
for Unemployment Insurance benefits, even when they have substantial labor 
force attachment. This problem is especially pronounced for low-wage indi-
viduals, many of whom must work in temporary or part-time jobs. Welfare 
reform could result in an increase in the number of low-wage workers who 
find themselves in this situation. 
Some unemployed workers are unable to qualify for Unemployment 
Insurance benefits because of their state's definition of the "base period." The 
base period is the period of time that is used for calculating whether or not 
unemployed individuals' earnings are sufficient to qualify them for 
Unemployment Insurance. Many states define the base period as the first four 
of the past five completed calendar quarters. In these states, therefore, 
between three and six months of an individual's most recent work experience 
is excluded from consideration in calculating eligibility for benefits. This 
may have the effect of disqualifying some workers who have worked contin-
uously, but who need the most recently completed quarter of earnings to be 
included in the base period in order to qualify for Unemployment Insurance 
benefits. To solve this problem, some states now use a "moveable base peri-
od," which allows the minimum earnings requirement to be met on the basis 
of the four most recently completed quarters of work if it is not met using the 
standard definition. 
The Council finds that advances in technology have made it feasible for 
all states to use the most recently completed quarter when determining ben-
efit eligibility, and that using this quarter is consistent with the legislative 
requirement that states ensure full payment of Unemployment Insurance 
when due. While the Council has been unable to develop sound estimates of 
the cost of implementing such a change, there are reasons to believe that the 
cost may not be prohibitive. First, many of the individuals who are deter-
mined to be eligible using a moveable base period would become eligible 
eventually (as soon as an additional quarter of earnings information becomes 
available). Second, some of the increase in the cost of Unemployment 
Insurance benefits would be offset by a reduction in benefits paid under 
means-tested programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) and Food Stamps. 
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In some cases, unemployed individuals cannot qualify for Unemployment 
Insurance benefits because their eligibility is contingent upon their earnings 
in the calendar quarter in which they became unemployed. Information about 
their most recent earnings is typically not available until after the quarter has 
been completed. These individuals often do not realize that they can reapply 
(and often qualify) for benefits when information about their most recent 
quarter of earnings becomes available. This problem could be corrected if 
these individuals were told when they should reapply for benefits, as well as 
what additional earnings they would need to qualify for benefits. 
1995-17. Recommendation 
All states should use a moveable base period in cases in which its 
use would qualify an Unemployment Insurance claimant to meet 
the state's monetary eligibility requirements. When a claimant fails 
to meet the monetary eligibility requirement for Unemployment 
Insurance, the state should inform the individual in writing of what 
additional earnings would be needed to qualify for benefits, as well 
as the date when the individual should reapply for benefits. 
In some states, low-wage workers face an additional impediment in qual-
ifying for Unemployment Insurance benefits. In order to meet their state's 
base period and/or high-quarter earnings requirements, low-wage individu-
als must work more hours than workers who earn higher wages. For exam-
ple, an individual who works half-time for a full year (i.e., 1,040 hours) at 
the federal minimum wage level would n9t meet minimum earnings require-
ments in 9 states. At an hourly wage of $8.00, however, a half-time, full-
year worker would be eligible in all states. Similarly, an individual who 
works two days per week for a full year (approximately 800 hours) at the 
minimum wage would not meet the minimum earnings requirements in 29 
states. At a wage of $8.00 per hour, however, that individual would be eli-
gible in all but 2 states. 
The Council finds that any individual who works at least 800 hours per 
year should be eligible for Unemployment Insurance benefits and that states' 
minimum earnings requirements should be set accordingly. If all states set 
their earnings requirements at this level, the number of individuals eligible 
for Unemployment Insurance benefits would increase by approximately 5.3 
percent, and the amount of benefits paid would increase by approximately 
3.6 percent. Some of the increase in the cost to the system, however, would 
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be offset by a reduction in receipt of means-tested benefits such as AFDC and 
Food Stamps. 
1995-18. Recommendation 
Each state should set its law so that its base period earnings 
requirements do not exceed 800 times the state's minimum hourly 
wage, and so that its high quarter earnings requirements do not 
exceed one-quarter of that amount. 
Fourteen states preclude workers in seasonal industries from collecting 
Unemployment Insurance except during the season in which work is nor-
mally done within the industry. In addition, twelve of these states disallow 
seasonal workers' earnings from being counted toward their minimum earn-
ings requirement, even if the individual subsequently works in a nonseason-
al job. The Council finds these exclusions to be problematic. 
1995-19. Recommendation 
States should eliminate seasonal exclusions; claimants who have 
worked in seasonal jobs should be subject to the same eligibility 
requirements as all other unemployed workers. 
In addition to the monetary requirements for qualifying for Unem-
ployment Insurance, each state has a variety of nonmonetary requirements 
that unemployed individuals must satisfy in order to qualify for benefits. 
These requirements include stipulations about availability for suitable work, 
ability to work, work search requirements, voluntary separation for good 
cause, discharges due to misconduct, refusal of suitable work, and unem-
ployment as a result of a labor dispute. In some cases, part-time workers 
(who meet monetary eligibility requirements) are explicitly precluded from 
receiving Unemployment Insurance. 
1995-20. Recommendation 
Workers who meet a state's monetary eligibility requirements 
should not be precluded from receiving Unemployment Insurance 
benefits merely because they are seeking part-time, rather than 
full-time, employment. 
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State legislation often does not address the specifics of many of the situ-
ations that Unemployment Insurance claimants face. As a result, interpreta-
tions of nonmonetary eligibility requirements can also be found in adminis-
trative and judicial case law and administrative rules. Testimony presented in 
the Council's public hearings indicates that the complexity of these nonmon-
etary requirements creates confusion about eligibility requirements. It can be 
difficult for both claimants and employers to understand these requirements 
with a reasonable degree of certainty. These problems can be particularly 
pronounced for multistate employers. 
Not only can this lack of certainty impede the receipt of Unemployment 
Insurance, it may also increase unnecessarily the number of appeals filed by 
both claimants and employers. These problems appear to be particularly 
severe with regard to determinations involving employee misconduct, refusal 
of suitable work, and voluntary leaving for good cause. Clarifying these 
issues would serve the interests of both groups. * 
1995-21. Recommendation 
A state-specific information packet that clearly explains 
Unemployment Insurance eligibility conditions (both monetary 
and nonmonetary) should be distributed by the states to unem-
ployed individuals. 
The Council is particularly concerned about a number of specific non-
monetary eligibility conditions. For example, it is not always clear whether 
an individual who is unavailable for shift work (perhaps due to a lack of pub-
lic transportation or child care) will be found to be eligible for 
Unemployment Insurance. Consideration needs to be given to situations in 
which individuals quit their jobs because of one of the following circum-
stances: a change in their employment situation (e.g., change in hours of 
work), sexual or other discriminatory harassment, domestic violence, or 
compelling personal reasons, including family responsibilities. In addition, 
the Council is concerned about the variability in the definition of misconduct 
across states, and about the treatment of individuals who refuse employment 
because it is temporary or commission work. The Council intends to address 
these and related issues in its third annual report. ** 
*Additional recommendations on this issue can be found in 1996-8 and 1996-10. 
**See Recommendation 1996-8. 
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ADEQUACY OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
At the inception of the Unemployment Insurance system, much debate was 
devoted to the adequacy of benefits. Many of the founders of the system 
argued that benefits should replace 50 percent of lost earnings; they believed 
that this percentage was high enough to allow workers to purchase basic 
necessities, but not so high as to discourage prompt return to work. 
A number of presidents, including and following Dwight Eisenhower, 
have endorsed a goal of 50 percent replacement of lost earnings within the 
Unemployment Insurance system. President Richard Nixon advocated that 
the Unemployment Insurance system should seek to replace 50 percent of 
lost earnings for four-fifths of all Unemployment Insurance recipients. 
The level of a state's maximum weekly benefit amount has a direct 
impact upon the percentage of Unemployment Insurance recipients who 
receive benefits that equal or exceed a given replacement rate. Those indi-
viduals whose earnings qualify them for their state's maximum weekly ben-
efit amount typically have less than half of their wages replaced. Therefore, 
when a state's maximum benefit amount is relatively low as a percentage of 
the state's average weekly wage, the state will not meet the 50 percent 
replacement rate goal for a large percentage of recipients. 
The Council endorses the long-standing goal of 50 percent replacement 
of lost earnings, and notes that a state is likely to be able to achieve this goal 
for a large number of workers by setting the state maximum weekly benefit 
amount equal to two-thirds of state average weekly wages. 
1995-22. Recommendation 
For eligible workers, each state should replace at least 50 percent of 
lost earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum weekly ben-
efit amount equal to two-thirds of the state's average weekly wages.3 
The Council also notes that, starting in 1986, all Unemployment Insur-
ance benefits became subject to taxation. Taxation of Unemployment Insur-
ance benefits results in a reduction of the effective replacement rate. 
1995-23. Recommendation 
Unemployment Insurance benefits should be tax-exempt.4 
J One member of the Council objects to this recommendation. 
4 Four members of the Council object to this recommendation. 
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The Council finds that the current system for reporting the average re-
placement rate of lost earnings within the Unemployment Insurance system 
needs to be improved. While the U.S. Department of Labor routinely reports 
the replacement rate, the concept used in the calculation is flawed. The 
reported replacement rate is calculated by dividing Unemployment Insurance 
benefits paid by the wages of all covered workers. To the extent that those 
who receive Unemployment Insurance have lower wages than the average 
covered worker, the reported replacement rate will understate the actual 
replacement rate. Conversely, if those who receive Unemployment Insurance 
have higher wages than the typical covered worker, the reported replacement 
rate will overstate the actual replacement rate. Advisory Council calculations 
using data available from selected states suggest that the reported replace-
ment rate significantly understates the actual replacement rate. * 
1995-24. Recommendation 
The U.S. Department of Labor should calculate and report the 
actual replacement rate for individuals who receive Unem-
ployment Insurance. This replacement rate should be calculated 
by dividing the weekly benefits paid to individuals by the average 
weekly earnings paid to those individuals prior to unemployment. 
REEMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES 
The Council finds that financial incentives (such as reemployment bonuses 
or self-employment subsidies) for facilitating rapid reemployment have a 
positive impact on a small portion of the unemployed. In some cases, this 
positive impact could be offset partially by negative impacts on others who 
find jobs more slowly because they are displaced in the job queue by those 
who receive the incentives. This displacement effect is likely to be more pro-
nounced during periods of relatively high unemployment. 
The Council concludes, therefore, that the states should be permitted to 
experiment with reemployment incentives, but it opposes incentives to 
encourage (or require) states to implement such strategies. 
Some members of the Council object to the use of self-employment 
incentives within the Unemployment Insurance system-especially when an 
individual's entire benefit is paid in lump-sum form. 
* Additional recommendations regarding data can be found in 1995-16, and 1996-12 to 1996-15. 
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1995-25. Recommendation 
States should be given broad discretion in determining whether 
reemployment incentives, such as reemployment bonuses or self-
employment allowances, should be included as a part of their 
Unemployment Insurance systems. 
ADMINISTRATIVE FINANCING 
States' administrative costs are financed by the federal government with a 
portion of the revenues generated by FUTA. This situation requires some sys-
tematic method for allocating these revenues among the states. The Council 
finds that whatever method is chosen, it is important to create financial 
incentives for states to administer their Unemployment Insurance systems 
efficiently. For example, those states that are able both to administer their 
Unemployment Insurance systems with less money than is allotted to them 
and to achieve U.S. Department of Labor performance requirements could be 
allowed to keep all or part of the surplus for other uses within their UI sys-
tems. The Council intends to address this issue, in conjunction with the U.S. 
Department of Labor's performance requirements, in its next annual report.* 
The U.S. Department of Labor has proposed an Administrative Financing 
Initiative (API) that would allocate FUTA funds based on a national unit cost 
with base-level and contingency-level funding. The Council takes no posi-
tion on the API, because the U.S. Department of Labor and the states have 
not yet agreed on the details of this initiative. 
The Council notes that it is inefficient for the federal government to 
require employers to fill out and submit separate forms and payments for their 
FUTA and state Unemployment Insurance taxes. Not only does this impose an 
unnecessary paperwork burden on employers, it also creates redundant tax 
. collection units in the federal and state governments. The expense of collect-
ing Unemployment Insurance taxes could be reduced by allowing the states to 
collect FUTA taxes on behalf of the federal government. 
1995-26. Recommendation 
FUTA taxes should be collected with other Unemployment 
Insurance taxes by each of the states and submitted to the feder-
. 
*See Recommendations 1996·6 to 1996-8, and 1996-16 to 1996-19, and the findings that precede 
those recommendations. 
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al government for placement in the federal trust fund. States' 
Unemployment Insurance taxes should remain in the state trust 
funds, as is currently the case. 

3 / 1996 Findings 
and Recommendations: 
Defining Federal 
and State Roles 
THE NATION'S UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE system is based on the sharing of 
responsibilities between the federal government and the state governments. 
The Council finds that this framework, which has evolved over 60 years, 
could be made more effective by implementing changes based on a refined 
understanding of the appropriate division of responsibilities between the 
federal and state partners. This finding leads the Council to a formulation 
of the following statement of federal-state responsibilities in Unemploy-
ment Insurance. * 
1996-1. Federal-State Responsibilities in Unemployment Insurance 
Unemployment Insurance is a federal-state system of shared 
responsibilities and powers. These powers and responsibilities 
should be shared in the most effective possible manner. Whenever 
appropriate, state governments should assume broad responsibil-
ities for determining the elements of their Unemployment 
Insurance programs. The federal government should assume 
responsibility primarily in those areas in which both an essential 
national interest exists and states' interests may diverge from 
those national interests. 
The fundamental objective of the system is the provision of 
insurance in the form of temporary, partial wage replacement to 
NOTE: These findings and recommendations are reprinted from Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation (ACUC), Defining Federal and State Roles in Unemployment Insurance (Washington, 
DC: ACUC, 1996), pp. 7-19. 
*The Council provided a statement of purpose for the Unemployment Insurance system in its 
1995 report (see 1995-1). 
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workers experiencing involuntary unemployment. Federal 
involvement in this area should limit that competition among 
states on the basis of Unemployment Insurance costs that under-
mines the integrity of the system and the capacity of the program 
to insure workers adequately. A second objective of the system is 
the accumulation of adequate funds during periods of economic 
health, thereby promoting economic stability by maintaining con-
sumer purchasing power during economic downturns. The 
achievement of these fundamental purposes, which serve the 
national interest and transcend the interests of any individual 
state, require federal oversight and action. 
FEDERAL-STATE INTERACTIONS 
Federal Responsibility in Areas of Essential National Interest 
As noted above, there are two primary areas of essential national interest that 
may diverge from state interests: the provision of adequate insurance to 
workers throughout the country and macroeconomic stabilization. The pro-
gram's capacity to meet these two fundamental objectives first depends upon 
the existence of state VI programs, and second, requires the proper function-
ing of a number of specific program components, each of which can be erod-
ed through the dynamics of interstate competition. The components are enu-
merated in this section and are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this report. 
The Council finds evidence that escalating competition among some 
states to attract and retain business may result in VI tax rates that are lower 
than they would be without this competition (see Chapter 4 of this report). 
Reduced state VI taxes frequently result in tightened eligibility standards, 
which adversely and disproportionately affect low-wage workers. In addi-
tion, tax competition could result in reductions in benefit levels or in dimin-
ished access to services. 
Consequently, to ensure the achievement of the first national objective-
the provision of temporary, partial wage replacement to workers experienc-
ing involuntary unemployment-the federal government should act to pre-
vent any potentially destructive consequences arising from interstate compe-
tition. Thus, there are two primary areas in which federal involvement is nec-
essary-minimum eligibility and benefit levels, and access to services. 
To assure the achievement of the second national objective-the counter-
cyclical stabilization of the national economy-a unified national strategy is 
required. Thus, it is the responsibility of the federal government to take 
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action, as necessary, to preserve the four components that enable the program 
to stabilize the economy during periods of economic downturn. The four 
components follow. First, state programs should be forward-funded with 
independent trust funds in order to ensure that the VI system as a whole has 
the capacity to inject additional money into the economy during recessions 
and in order to reduce the need to raise taxes during economic downturns. * 
Second, state VI benefit levels should be high enough and should be paid to 
a large enough percentage of the involuntarily unemployed to support effi-
cient economic stabilization efforts. ** Third, the capacity must exist to mon-
itor and analyze national and local labor market conditions consistently and 
quickly. Fourth, any supplemental mechanism for stabilization (for example, 
Extended Benefits or contingency administrative funding during times of 
unusually high unemployment) should be maintained and coordinated at the 
national level. * * * 
Thus, to protect essential national interests, the federal government must 
take responsibility for protecting specific components of the UI program 
when autonomous state action might adversely affect the national interest. To 
preserve the components discussed above, federal involvement is necessary 
in the seven areas listed in Recommendation 2. In each of these areas, feder-
al requirements should be as clear and as simple as possible. 
1996-2. Recommendation 
To preserve national interests in the UI system, the federal gov-
ernment should take an active role in the following areas: 
(1) ensuring the existence of a UI system in each state; (2) pro-
moting the forward funding of the system; (3) monitoring and 
coordinating the collection of information on labor market con-
ditions; (4) promoting economic stability by maintaining supple-
mental benefit programs that trigger on automatically during 
recessions, thereby avoiding the need for costly federal emer-
gency benefits; (5) coordinating the efficient pooling of risk by 
making loans available to states experiencing prolonged reces-
sions; (6) assuring that all workers with a given level of attach-
*The Council made recommendations on forward funding (Recommendations 1995-3 to 1995-6) 
in its 1995 report. 
**The Council made a number of recommendations in regard to eligibility and benefit levels in 
its 1995 report (see, in particular, Recommendations 1995-9 and 1995-17 to 1995-20). 
***The Council's recommendations for improving the operation of the Extended Benefits pro-
gram are contained in its 1994 report (Recommendations 1994-1 to 1994-6). 
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ment to the work force are eligible for a minimum level of bene-
fits; and (7) promoting quality and efficiency in program out-
comes. 
Federal Oversight in Other Areas 
While taking a role in the areas listed in Recommendation 2, the federal gov-
ernment should avoid involvement in program areas in which essential 
national interests are not at stake. Indeed, in these areas, the federal govern-
ment should take steps to encourage state experimentation and to enhance 
state flexibility. Program details in such areas are better left to the discretion 
of the states, which function more efficiently as "laboratories of democracy" 
and which may be able to provide better service to their citizens. Thus, fed-
eral involvement should exist primarily in those areas in which there are 
essential national interests at stake. 
A number of current federal laws, federal regulations, and federal over-
sight functions affecting VI do not meet these criteria and should therefore 
be repealed or discontinued. Included are the following: requirements that 
the states must disqualify certain categories of workers (for example, pro-
fessional athletes and school employees who are between terms) and reduce 
unemployed workers' VI benefits if they receive certain other types of 
retirement income; standards that the states must meet in order to qualify for 
full Extended Benefits funding (for example, the imposition of a waiting 
week for benefits and requirements that recipients meet stricter definitions 
of continuing eligibility); and a variety of oversight functions which are dis-
cussed below. 
1996-3. Recommendation 
Federal requirements that states disqualify certain categories of 
workers (for example, professional athletes and school employees 
who are between terms) should be repealed. 
1996-4. Recommendation 
Federal requirements that certain types of workers' retirement 
income offset UI benefits should be repealed. 
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1996-5. Recommendation 
Federal requirements that states meet certain standards in order 
to receive full funding for Extended Benefits should be repealed. 
ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES 
Measurement of Performance Outcomes 
Performance measures within the UI system should focus on program out-
comes rather than on program processes, since the latter are within the 
purview of the states. In addition, performance requirements should be con-
fined to areas in which there is both an essential national interest and a poten-
tial divergence of national and state interests. There is no need to monitor 
program inputs or state performance in areas in which state and national 
interests coincide. Moreover, these areas involve program processes rather 
than program outcomes, which, as stated, should be the responsibility of the 
states. Some of these areas, including aspects of benefit payment and revenue 
collection, are currently regulated by elaborate federal quality control pro-
grams (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
By selecting only essential measures of performance outcomes, the fed-
eral government would underscore the importance of state performance on 
those particular measures. Currently, the relative importance of various out-
comes may be obscured by the large number of performance measurements 
required of the states. Further, the elimination of unnecessary performance 
measures should reduce state administrative burdens considerably and would 
ensure that available resources were dedicated to achieving the outcomes 
identified as most essential to the functioning of the system. Finally, the 
selection of clear and easily measured outcomes would promote a better 
understanding of the Unemployment Insurance system. 
The federal government should, however, require the measurement of 
performance outcomes in essential program areas in which national and state 
interests may diverge. Some such areas are not currently subject to perfor-
mance measurement, including forward funding and the ease of claimants' 
access to the system, which is discussed below. 
The Council is aware of the efforts of the Performance Enhancement 
Work Group, which consists of representatives from the state employment 
security agencies (SESAs) and the U.S. Department of Labor. This group has 
been working since 1993 to improve the performance of the UI system by 
improving the measurement of performance within the system. While this 
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collaborative effort is commendable, additional work needs to be done on the 
fundamental issues· of forward funding and access to the system. 
The Council finds that there would be benefit in undertaking a more fun-
damental re-engineering of UI performance measurement. Such an effort 
should be based on careful consideration of the basic objectives of the UI 
program. Required performance measures, as well as the reports on UI that 
the U.S. Department of Labor requires of the states, should be designed to 
ensure that the basic objectives of the system are achieved. 
The Council finds that four principles should be applied in shaping an 
appropriate set of outcomes to be measured within the Unemployment 
Insurance system. First, the measures should reflect the fundamental purpos-
es of the Unemployment Insurance system. Second, performance measures 
should focus on the system's outcomes, rather than on the amount of input or 
the processes by which outcomes are achieved. Third, those measures of per-
formance outcomes that are identified as essential should be as clear and sim-
ple as possible. Fourth, the application of these measures of performance 
should ensure equity in the treatment of both claimants and employers. 
1996-6. Recommendation 
The federal priority in the area of performance measurement 
should be to ensure that required performance measures empha-
size the essential national interests of the UI system. The national 
interests that could be influenced by the system of performance 
measurement, but that are not currently incorporated in it, 
include forward funding and access to the system. 
The current federal emphasis on benefit quality control measures is 
excessive and should be reduced, because ensuring that benefits are not over-
paid should be a state rather than a federal responsibility. Similarly, ensuring 
that ill taxes are collected when they are due is a state responsibility that can 
be accomplished with minimal federal oversight. Given that employers' tax 
rates form a critical part of the nation's statistical system, some federal over-
sight in this regard is appropriate. 
1996-7. Recommendation 
In cooperation with the U.S. Department of Labor, states should 
develop, monitor, and report their own measures of the quality 
of their procedures for UI benefit payment and revenue collec-
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tion, using generally accepted accounting principles and audit-
ing standards. 
1996-8. Recommendation 
The u.s. Department of Labor should work in partnership with 
the states to develop measures of access to the UI system. These 
measures should include but should not necessarily be limited to 
the ease with which individuals can apply for benefits and the 
extent to which individuals with a substantial attachment to the 
labor force are eligible for benefits. 
Factors to be considered in developing measures of the ease 
with which individuals can apply for benefits should include the 
following: (1) whether information that clearly explains the appli-
cation process is readily available, (2) how much time is required 
to complete the application process, and (3) whether it is possible 
to apply for benefits in languages commonly spoken by those who 
are served by the program. 
Factors that should be considered in developing measures of 
access to the UI system include whether individuals with a sub-
stantial work history are excluded for any of the following reasons: 
(1) they have worked in seasonal jobs, (2) their wages are low, 
(3) their most recently completed quarter of wages was not includ-
ed in measuring their monetary eligibility, (4) they quit their job for 
legitimate family-related reasons, (5) they are unable to accom-
modate an employer's change in job conditions, (6) they are seek-
ing part-time work, or (7) they are unable to accept shift work. 
Inadequate or incomplete information about the VI claims or appeals 
processes among some claimants may have the effect of restricting their 
access to the VI system. Similarly, a lack of information or understanding 
among some employers may result in their being charged for illegitimate 
claims, resulting in higher VI taxes. In its 1995 report, the Council recom-
mended that states distribute an information packet on eligibility require-
ments to unemployed individuals. Additional state efforts would also help 
guarantee that all parties interact equitably-"on a level playing field"-
within the VI system. These efforts should be directed at ensuring that 
claimants and employers enter the system with a common understanding of 
the nature of relevant proceedings. 
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1996-9. Recommendation 
Each state should establish a mechanism, such as an ombudsman's 
office, to provide claimants or employers with any requested 
information on procedures or requirements in the claims or 
appeals processes. 
1996-1 O. Recommendation 
The federal guarantee of a fair hearing should be interpreted to 
include the unrestricted right of appeals participants to represen-
tation of their own choosing. Each state should provide clear 
notice of this right to all claimants and employers. 
1996-11. Recommendation 
Each state should provide information to claimants and employers 
on available sources of advice or advocacy assistance. 
Data Needs and Reporting Requirements 
Throughout its long history, the UI program has produced a vast amount of 
information. These UI data are used for a variety of purposes, such as admin-
istering the UI program itself, facilitating its interaction with other federal 
and state programs, and contributing information to the nation's statistical 
system. For example, the UI tax records and data collected by the states to 
determine labor force attachment and the earnings of workers cover most of 
the nation's business establishments and almost all of the nation's workers. 
These data constitute a large body of administrative information about the 
labor market and are therefore extraordinarily important. 
Individual states use UI information to operate the program, to evaluate 
efficiencies, and to conduct research on UI issues. The federal UI Service 
uses the data to monitor the work of the states, to carry out Ul research, to 
administer the system, and to ensure that federal UI program standards have 
been met. In addition, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the statistical 
arm of the U.S. Department of Labor, relies on the state employment and 
earnings reports for survey benchmarks, and it uses the UI tax records to 
form the universe of business establishments for sample surveys. 
In spite of these varied uses, little systematic attention has been given to 
the comparability, accuracy, and completeness of this rich data source. 
Indeed, the Council frequently found it impossible to obtain comparable state 
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data for analyzing many of the questions it addressed. Further, only occa-
sional attention has been given to the format, editing standards, uniformity of 
data definition, completeness, and ease of computerized access to the base of 
information that flows from the UI system. 
These conditions are not surprising. Until recently, the informational 
value of administrative data was not universally recognized. Few have under-
stood the need for the precision and quality control that distinguish a statis-
tical database for research purposes from a program database that ensures the 
delivery of services. Today, data are increasingly used to monitor the econo-
my and to evaluate public policy, and the value of administrative program 
records as an efficient and cost-effective source of information with minimal 
need for additional reporting burden cannot be overlooked. To allow fuller 
utilization of this resource, the quality and comparability of these adminis-
trative data should be improved. 
Congress has already taken some steps to meet this need. In 1992, it 
required the BLS to determine procedures for creating a national longitudi-
nal wage record database with information on earnings, establishment and 
industry classification, and geographic location of employment for all work-
ers covered by the UI system. This improved database will be extremely 
valuable for research, program evaluation, and statistical purposes. 
Nor should other survey-based sources of data about the UI system be 
overlooked. The BLS-sponsored Current Population Survey (CPS) provides 
a rich body of information about the U.S. labor force, employment, and 
unemployment. The UI Service, which has occasionally sponsored special 
supplements of the CPS, should develop a careful plan for regular periodic 
supplements to collect detailed information on UI recipients. 
Another important survey source of data used for UI research is the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), conducted by the 
Bureau of the Census. The SIPP provides an important longitudinal database 
that includes workers who receive UI benefits, as well as those who partici-
pate in other federal and state-sponsored programs. While the SIPP provides 
much important information about the behavior of UI recipients that is not 
available elsewhere, many researchers find it unwieldy and extremely diffi-
cult to use. It is important that SIPP data be made more accessible. 
In summary, the Council finds a need for a systematic and comprehensive 
system of administrative and survey data about the UI program for use in the 
following areas: (1) analytical research on the program's outcomes, (2) 
development of improvements in the program's conceptual design, and (3) 
enhancement of the country's understanding of the labor market behavior of 
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workers and employers covered by the program. In addition, there is signifi-
cant need to improve the quality and timeliness of the VI tax reports, which 
form the universe for sample selection and the benchmark for many of the 
nation's most important statistical selies. The Council finds that the federal 
government should be responsible for the design and oversight of a compre-
hensive VI information system consisting of administrative and survey-based 
data that are comparable among all states. * 
1996-12. Recommendation 
The U.S. Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance Service, 
with advice from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, should design the 
elements of a comprehensive information system of UI data that 
are comparable in definition and format for all states. Some of the 
elements that should be included are data on (1) coverage and eli-
gibility by earnings level and by type of worker; (2) the elements of 
labor market attachment; (3) the levels and duration of benefits 
paid; (4) the extent and causes of nonmonetary disqualifications; 
(5) labor market information at the national, state, and local lev-
els; (6) the extent of forward funding of state trust funds; and (7) 
the quality, efficiency, and cost of program administration at both 
the federal and state levels. Each state should maintain its database 
in accordance with U.S. Department of Labor requirements so that 
statistical standards, definitional comparability, and easy comput-
er access for all users can be maintained. 
1996-13. Recommendation 
The U.S. Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance Service 
should continue to plan and sponsor biennial supplements to the 
Current Population Survey on UI issues. 
1996-14. Recommendation 
Because of the importance of the quarterly report on employment 
and wages (the ES-202 report) to the measurement of the nation-
al income and product accounts, and because of the importance 
of UI tax records to the nation's system of sample surveys, the 
*The Council made two specific recommendations about data collection in its 1995 report 
(Recommendations 1995-16 and 1995-24). 
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accuracy and statistical quality of these reports must be improved. 
Giving consideration to costs, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, with 
advice from the Unemployment Insurance Service, should estab-
lish standard procedures that states should follow regarding the 
development of these data; establish magnetic-media format stan-
dards for computer compatibility and accessibility; and establish 
minimum requirements for editing, data quality, and timeliness. 
1996-15. Recommendation 
As required by law, the Bureau of Labor Statistics should contin-
ue its work on the development of a National Wage Record 
Database. The Bureau should develop rules to protect the confi-
dentiality of those workers and business establishments included 
in the database for purposes of research and evaluation. Congress 
should provide legal protection to ensure this confidentiality. 
Administrative Funding 
The Council finds that the nation's Unemployment Insurance system is 
subject to downward pressure because of the forces of interstate competi-
tion. It is imperative that the federal government exercise leadership to 
ameliorate these pressures. An important arena for such leadership con-
cerns the method by which the federal government allocates funds under 
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) to the states for administering 
the DI system. Indeed, the critical importance of efficient administration 
was cited by the Committee on Economic Security in 1935 as the reason 
for originally assigning the cost of state administration of the UI program 
to the federal government. 
The mechanism for allocating FUTA funds to the states for administrative 
purposes should be as simple as possible, and should provide incentives to 
promote efficiency and quality in state administration. As currently con-
structed, however, the system of allocating administrative funds contains no 
such incentives. Funding levels are based roughly on the expected claims 
workload, on measures of time (generally based on manual processing) for 
administrative tasks, and on overhead costs. Under this formula, states with 
higher costs receive higher levels of reimbursements. 
More importantly, the formula provides no direct link between admin-
istrative funds and improvements in performance, and there are no overall 
quality measures related to funding decisions. In the Council's view, states 
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that provide better services to claimants and employers by improving qual-
ity and efficiency should receive financial rewards for doing so. This might 
be achieved through a number of mechanisms, including the tying of 
administrative funding levels to state performance in certain essential areas 
and increasing the federal government's use of challenge or innovation 
grants to states. 
The Council finds that the appropriation of administrative funding on the 
basis of predicted workloads, reflecting economic conditions and increases in 
operating costs, is the method that best serves the needs of claimants, 
employers, and state agencies for reliable and predictable levels of adminis-
trative funding. These appropriations should be automatically adjusted to 
cover the costs of increased workload for claims above the predicted level. 
The Council affirms its concern that adequate amounts of dedicated FUTA 
payroll tax revenues be made available to state agencies and to the U.S. 
Department of Labor for their intended uses, and that appropriations of these 
funds not be limited by budgetary factors external to the UI system. * 
1996-16. Recommendation 
Congress should appropriate FUTA trust funds in amounts ade-
quate to fund state and federal UI activities on the basis of work-
load predictions using economic factors, with a contingency 
reserve provision to cover the costs of increased workloads aris-
ing during a fiscal year. 
1996-17. Recommendation 
In order to support automation, development of one-stop ser-
vices, and improvements in customer services, added state 
administrative funds beyond those needed for base funding 
should be provided through innovation grants by the U.S. 
Department of Labor. 
1996-18. Recommendation 
The U.S. Department of Labor should promptly review its current 
reporting and oversight requirements, in consultation with the 
states, and should reduce or eliminate requirements in areas in 
*The Council made a recommendation in this regard in its 1995 report (Recommendation 1995-7), 
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which state and national interests are not in conflict or in which 
federal responsibilities are not directly related to a requirement. 
1996-19. Recommendation 
States should be given greater flexibility to identify employers for 
tax auditing. As an incentive for more effective auditing, the fed-
eral government should permit states to retain 50 percent of any 
FUTA revenues that are generated through state's redirected 
auditing activities. 
EXPERIENCE RATING AND FUNDING 
As the Council noted in it second annual report, the Unemployment 
Insurance system's capacity to achieve one of its fundamental purposes-
promoting economic stability-rests on two key aspects of its funding mech-
anism. First, the funding of the system is "experience rated"-that is, 
employers who have been responsible for greater demands on the system pay 
higher taxes and consequently bear a greater share of the system's costs. 
Second, during periods of prosperity, the system accumulates reserves that 
are then spent during periods of economic decline. 
Empirical evidence indicates that experience rating helps discourage tem-
porary layoffs, thereby lowering the overall level of unemployment. In addi-
tion, the evidence suggests that experience-rated taxes are more effective 
than are flat taxes in influencing employer behavior in this regard. This may 
be because experience-rated taxes are borne primarily by employers, where-
as flat taxes are more easily passed on indirectly to employees or to con-
sumers. By assigning a greater share of the costs of the system to employers 
responsible for greater demands on it, a system of experience rating allocates 
costs more equitably among employers. Finally, experience rating gives 
employers an interest in ensuring that benefits are paid only to individuals 
who meet the program's eligibility criteria. 
Some members of the Council are concerned, however, with a number of 
aspects of the experience-rating system. First, such a system often imposes 
costs on firms precisely when they are in the weakest economic position. 
Second, under a system of experience rating, some employers might make 
excessive use of the appeals system. There is evidence that employers' 
appeals rates have increased in recent years and that they are losing a higher 
percentage of the appeals they file. Finally, the steady decline in the level of 
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the taxable wage base in real dollars may have the effect of reducing the 
degree to which the system is experience-rated and forward-funded. 
Given these differing perspectives, the Council makes no recommenda-
tion with regard to experience rating within the VI system. 
With respect to the second key element of the VI system's funding-the 
accumulation of reserves during periods of prosperity-empirical evidence 
indicates that, holding all else constant, those states with higher taxable wage 
bases have higher VI trust fund reserves. Thus, in order to promote the for-
ward funding of the VI system-a federal responsibility-one of the most 
effective mechanisms is to raise the minimum taxable wage base. * 
1996-20. Recommendation 
The federal taxable wage base should be raised to $9,000, with an 
accompanying elimination of the two-tenths percentage point 
FUTA surcharge. The federal taxable wage base should be adjust-
ed annually by the Employment Cost Index.' 
*The Council made another recommendation in regard to the taxable wage base in its 1994 report 
(Recommendation 1994-5). 
I Three members of the Council object to the first sentence of Recommendation 1996-20, and five 
members object to its second sentence. 
Index 
Administrative financing initiative, 24 
Administrative funding, 38 
Alien agricultural workers (H2-A), FUTA 
taxation of, 7 
Benefit payment and revenue collection 
measures, 32-33 
Calculation and reporting of replacement 
rate, 23 
Data needs in UI system, 36 
Development of National Wage Record 
Database, 37 
Eligibility, 19,20,21 
Elimination of FUTA surcharge, 40 
Exclusions for seasonal workers, 20 
Exclusions of categories of workers, 30 
Experience Rating, 39-40 
Extended Benefits 
financing reform, 5 
long-term unemployed, 2 
trigger, 3, 4 
work search requirement, 6 
Extended Benefits and federal require-
ments,31 
Fair hearing guarantee, 34 
Farm labor contractors, 15 
Federal loans to state trust funds, 12, 13 
Federal responsibilities, 27, 29 
Forward-funding goal, 11 
Incentives for more effective tax 
auditing, 39 
Information for claimants and 
employers, 34 
Innovation grants to states, 38 
41 
Interest rate structure for state trust 
funds, 11 
Measures of access to UI system, 33 
Measuring progress toward forward-
funding goal, 12 
Minimum earnings requirement, 20 
Misclassification of independent 
contractors, 16, 17 
Moveable wage base, 19 
National interests, 27 
Nonprofit FUTA exemption, 15 
Part-time work, 20 
Performance measurement, 32 
Purpose of UI system, 10 
Quality of report on employment and 
wages (ES-202), 36-37 
Recipiency, measurement of, 17 
Reduction of reporting or oversight 
requirements, 38-39 
Reemployment incentives, 24 
Removal of UI trust fund from unified 
federal budget, 14 
Replacement rate, 22 
Retirement income offset, 30 
Satisfactory progress toward forward-
funding, definition of, 12 
Small farm tax exemption, 15 
State collection of FUTA taxes, 24-25 
Taxable wage base annual adjustment, 40 
Taxable wage base increase,S, 40 
Taxation of UI benefits, 22 
UI supplements to CPS, 36 
Unemployment Insurance, purpose 



















For additional copies of this compendium or for copies of the Advisory 
Council on Unemployment Compensation's annual reports from 1994,1995, 
or 1996, please call Esther R. Johnson of the U.S. Department of Labor at 
(202) 219-7831. Requests may also be submitted in writing to the following 
address: 
Ms. Esther R. Johnson 
Unemployment Insurance Service 
U.S. Department of Labor 
200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Room S-4231 
Washington, DC 20210 
The information contained in this publication will be made available to 
sensory-impaired individuals upon request. Voice phone: (202) 219-7831; 
TDD Message Retrieval phone: (800) 326-2577. 

